In his essay, which is part of a collection of articles examining the history of humanitarian action in Africa, Leben Nelson Moro discusses one of the most significant, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Established in 1989, OLS was set up in response to famine in Bahr-el Ghazal in Southern Sudan. Managed by the UN, it aimed to ensure aid access in government-held areas and to areas held by the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). As Moro explains, the establishment of OLS served a variety of political objectives in addition to its stated aim of famine relief: for the UN, OLS, ‘the first multilateral humanitarian action following the end of the Cold War’, was a statement of intent that the organisation now intended to play a larger global role, while access to humanitarian assistance also ‘fitted neatly into the political calculations of the rebel movement and the government’. Ultimately, Moro judges OLS a qualified success: while it undoubtedly saved lives, it did not – nor was it intended to – get to the heart of the issues driving the conflict. To that extent, OLS is emblematic of one of the central dilemmas of humanitarian assistance today.