Aweil North County, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 129,898
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 362,132
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 168,813

Ethnic groups: Dinka Malual (Giernyang)

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 12,000 IDPs (+7,897 Q1 2020) and 31,725 returnees (-3,918 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Emergency (Phase 4); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4); April to July 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Aweil North County is located in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Aweil West County to the south and Aweil East County to the east. It also borders Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (Raja County) to the west and Sudan (East Darfur State) to the north.

The county falls under the western flood plains sorghum and cattle livelihood zone (FEWSNET 2018), with grassland, swampy areas with papyrus reed, and pockets of forest found in this area. According to the FAO and WFP (2022), an estimated 80% of households were farmers, with a gross cereal yield of 0.95 tonnes per hectare in 2021. This yield fell to 0.9 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). The main crops are sorghum, groundnut, sesame, maize and vegetables. Sandy soil is generally found in the county’s north, near the border with Sudan, and is considered the most fertile. In addition to farming in Aweil North, seasonal migration of young men into commercial farm work and peri-urban manual labour in Sudan has been a longstanding seasonal dynamic (Kindersley & Majok 2019).

Decades of conflict and insecurity within South Sudan and across the border in Sudan’s Darfur and Kordofan regions have accelerated pre-existing patterns of migration through forced displacement from Aweil to Sudan and elsewhere. Periodic closures of the border with Sudan (with which local markets have been historically integrated), runaway inflation and widespread insecurity since 2012 have further deepened this trend. This has been reflected in high levels of food insecurity, indebtedness, and exploitation as part of agricultural labour or participation in armed groups (Kindersley and Majok 2019). This progressive monetization of land, life and work in Aweil has pushed many poor residents into insecure waged labour, precarious systems of rent and high interest short-term loans.

The outbreak of conflict in Sudan in April 2023 has impacted the traditional labour migration from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal to farms in Darfur and Kordofan, resulting in a loss of remittance revenue. Additionally, the flow of goods from Sudan into Northern Bahr el-Ghazal has been severely affected by the conflict. Influx of large numbers of returnees – some of whom have never left northern Sudan – has also put strain on resources (Majok 2024, p.12).

The IPC projections for the county were at Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels in November 2022, and is projected to remain the same level throughout the first half of 2023 due to persistent food insecurity in the county. Flooding is a regular concern for both agriculturalists and pastoralists, resulting in damaged crops and homesteads, and at times in a loss of cattle. Flooding has also hindered cross-border transport and trade between Gok-Machar town and East Darfur State in Sudan (Radio Tamazuj 2021a). Changing weather patterns and flooding have also meant that cattle have to migrate in non-traditional patterns, limiting access to milk to supplement food sources. Additionally, an increase in livestock diseases and mortality have hindered cattle-keeping as a viable livelihood in the area.

INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES

The headquarters of Aweil North County is based in Gok Machar town, located in Malual North Payam. Due to the county’s proximity to Sudan, its trade and migration routes leading to the northern border have been impacted by border closures, natural disasters as well as inter-communal violence.

Aweil North is home to one hundred and nineteen (119) primary schools and four (4) secondary schools. There are currently no Early Childhood Development centres in Aweil North County.

Aweil North County was reported to have forty-four (44) health facilities including thirty-eight (38) functional health facilities, among them thirty-three (33) PHCUs and five (5) PHCCs in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 2.58 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.48 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO, which ranks Aweil North as among the ten counties with the highest ratios of PHCUs/person in South Sudan. No hospitals were reported in Aweil North County.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, over 118,100 people are considered to have humanitarian needs in Aweil North County (up slightly from 115,100 in 2021), which is approximately 70% of the estimated population for the county reported in the HNO. In 2020, OCHA considered Aweil North as one of fourteen counties where GBV needs are considered “extreme”. Minimal infrastructure and services contribute to the significant food insecurity in the county. This in turn has made the county more reliant on humanitarian aid to support the population. Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 8,529 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan registered in Aweil North County (948 at Jaach, 7,439 at Kiir Adem, and 142 at Gok Machar) (UNHCR/IOM 2023).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Aweil North sits along a (disputed) part of the border between Sudan’s East Darfur and West Kordofan states and South Sudan’s Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State. The state was particularly affected during the first and second Sudanese civil wars (1955-1972, and 1983-2005), with relations between ethnic groups either side of the Sudanese border becoming strained in the 1970s. These groups comprise the Dinka Malual (the largest group in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal), and the Rizeigat (mainly from East Darfur) and Misseriya (mainly from West Kordofan), who have a shared history predating the colonisation of Sudan. This history has been characterised by inter-marriage, conflict, and peacemaking, and the provision of shelter during times of danger (Majak 1991; Duffield et al., p.36).

As the 1980s progressed, the border area in the northern half of the state became increasingly militarised, with mass displacement and famine being the outcome of a series of violent cross-border incursions by government-aligned pastoralist militias. The violence during the late 1980s has had a profound effect on inter-group relations in more recent years, which have also been embroiled in the disputed 14-Mile Area (discussed below). Despite periods of strained cross-border relations, the state has hosted communities from Sudan seeking safety from the conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that began in 2023.

Border politics from the late 1970s to the late 1980s

Until the mid-1970s, relations between Dinka Malual and Sudanese pastoralist communities who crossed into the state had been effectively regulated by customary authorities, with disputes over grazing or resources being resolved through traditional conflict resolution methods (Kindersley 2018, p.17; PACT Sudan 2006, pp.205-6). However, prior to the second civil war tensions had begun to increase between parts of the Dinka Malual and Rizeigat communities. Meanwhile, both the Rizeigat and Misseriya were suffering from the effects of drought and a loss of cattle herds, with the Misseriya also experiencing land pressures due to spread of mechanised farming. After the start of the conflict in 1983 – and amid increasingly frequent raids by armed groups of Sudanese pastoralists, known locally as murahalin – Sudanese authorities refused to intervene in cross-border disputes, resulting in mounting grievances among border communities, notably the Dinka Malual (Keen 1994/2008, p.59, 74, 81). During the previous year the government had transferred the Aweil Division of the SAF – who were largely Southern Sudanese, and had previously intervened to prevent Rizeigat raiding – to Darfur, leaving the area relatively unprotected.

In a theme that has since become recurrent, relations between communities along the border would be shaped and reshaped by higher-level political considerations and schisms, often leading to cycles of militarisation and conflict interspersed with periods of tense stability. By the early 1980s, raiding from groups of Misseriya and Rizeigat pastoralists led to the formation of local self-defence militias among the Dinka Malual. In 1984, the SPLM/A engaged in operations against the government’s garrison at Aweil town (Africa Rights 1990, p.116), while rural areas affected by raiding would provide recruits to the SPLM/A in a bid to strengthen their ability to defend themselves (Mawson 1991, pp.140-141). However, escalating conflict between the SPLM/A and government-aligned Anya-Nya 2 forces in parts of Greater Upper Nile restricted the ability of the SPLM/A to reposition soldiers from training centres in Ethiopia, due to repeated Anya-Nya 2 ambushes. This left a number of areas in the north-west further exposed to murahalin militia activity, as parts of the Misseriya and Rizeigat murahalin began to coordinate attacks.

By 1985, the Sudanese government had become concerned at the prospect of a rebellion from elements of the Misseriya and Rizeigat communities, and was increasingly equating the Dinka community at large with the SPLM/A (Majak 1991, p.79). Moreover, a lack of resources and military capabilities to resist the SPLM/A helped push the government to provide support and weapons to a number of pastoralist communities along the southern border as a cost-effective means to prosecute the war (Africa Watch 1990, p.82; Keen 1994/2008, p.69, 74).

These developments set the stage for increasingly serious raiding in areas near to the border by late 1985, alongside mass displacement to Aweil town and beyond. Raiding intensified across Aweil East, North, and South counties in 1986 and 1987: in addition to causing large numbers of civilian deaths, abductions had become increasingly widespread during the raids, while destruction of food stores and theft was commonplace (Africa Rights 1990, pp.82-83; Johnson 2010, p.45).

SPLM/A units eventually increased their presence in the state during 1986. Although concerns were raised about further pressures on food supplies caused by SPLM/A requisitioning (Africa Watch 1990, p.120), the movement made gains against murahalin militias in early 1987. The SPLM/A would come to consolidate control of many rural areas of the state, with the government retaining control of Aweil town and areas along the railway to northern Sudan (PACT Sudan 2006, p.170). Raiding declined by 1989, due to a combination of concern within parts of the SAF regarding the use of militias (Johson 2003, p.82), and an increased SPLM/A presence in areas up to the Bahr el-Arab/Kiir River. As a consequence of the displacement of people and cattle caused by previous murahalin raids, raiders were also required to venture greater distances. As a result, militias increasingly targeted Dinka civilians moving north across the border after 1989 (Africa Rights 1990, pp.84-85).

Conflict and peacebuilding from the 1990s to the CPA era (2005-2011)

Modest steps were made to repair relations between the Dinka Malual and Sudanese pastoralists following the violence of the 1980s. These included the establishment of a Malual-Misseriya peace market at Warawar in Aweil East in 1991, which was reportedly attacked by government forces on several occasions (Duffield et al. 2000, p.40, fn.246; Wilson 2014, p.11). However, conflict in the border area re-escalated at several points during the 1990s. Murahalin raids were reported in the 1992 dry season, with abductions resuming at scale in 1995 and 1996 (Kindersley 2018, p.36). Amidst the increase in violence, negotiations to limit hostilities, regulate grazing, and return abductees were ongoing (African Rights 1997, p.352). Conflict flared again between 1997 and 1999 in Aweil North and West counties as pro-government Darfurian forces escalated attacks, with violence reverberating to IDP camps in adjoining areas of Darfur (Duffield et al. 2000, pp.35-37; Kindersley 2018, p.25) Sporadic conflict between government and opposition forces continued in parts of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal in the early 2000s (Johnson 2003, pp.212-19).

In the wake of the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference, a peace agreement was reached between the Dinka Malual and Misseriya in April 2000, while a number of peace markets were established at Majok Nyinh-Thiou (in Aweil East) and Manyiel (in Aweil North) (Kindersley 2018, p.36). As progress was made in negotiating the series of agreements that would comprise the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), further dialogue was initiated in 2002 between representatives from Sudanese pastoralist communities and Dinka clans from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Abyei, and which also sought to address outstanding issues relating to infrastructure, displacement, and abductions (PACT Sudan 2006, p.213, 219-20, 230). This dialogue was followed by a series of grassroots peace meetings in 2004 and 2005 that were linked to a decline in cross-border raiding. Alongside cross-border peacemaking, a Greater Aweil peace meeting was convened in 2003 to address internal tensions and divisions among parts of the Dinka Malual community and neighbouring groups (including the Luo), while making progress to addressing deficits in service delivery and the consequences of displacement and damage to infrastructure (PACT Sudan 2006, p.216, 230).

Communities returned to Northern Bahr el-Ghazal in the 2000s and began the process of rebuilding. The cross-border economy has remained essential and provides the context for (often low-scale) conflict between migrating and host communities. Annual migrations from Sudanese pastoralists brings essential taxation and customs income while also placing strains on shared water and land resources. Regular peace dialogues have been held in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State to anticipate or mitigate tensions (Concordis International, 2012, p.53). These have brought together government and customary authorities through the creation of a Peace Actors Forum/Network chaired by the State Peace Coordinator, which typically meet on an annual basis.

While incidents of small-scale localised violence still occur, dispute resolution mechanisms have helped to limit violence through pre- and post-migration conferences between the Dinka Malual (principally the Giernyang and Paliou-piny sections), Luo and Rizeigat, and between the Dinka Malual (Abiem section) and Misseriya. These conferences have helped to establish migration routes, assign grazing pastures and water points, coordinate vaccine campaigns to address tensions arising from fear of spreading livestock disease, and settle outstanding compensation payments for damage to crops, livestock and communities. However, relation among parts of the Dinka communities of Aweil East and Aweil North counties were reported to have become strained during the 2010 elections, as is discussed further in the profile for Aweil East.

During the CPA era, periodic conflict and peacemaking took place in the shadow of tensions between Juba and Khartoum, and widening rifts within parts of the Misseriya and Rizeigat communities and between elements of these communities and the Sudanese government. Following intermittent fighting in 2007 and 2008, a Misseriya-Dinka Malual peace conference took place in April 2008 that outlined points of contention, and providing an opening for customary authorities to restore their role in resolving disputes. However, a lack of implementation the provisions of the peace conference, alongside several breaches of these provisions, resulted in a deterioration in relations over the following years (Wilson 2014, pp.13-14). In 2010, a Rizeigat-Dinka Malual conference made progress in affirming historical friendship between the two communities, while acknowledging responsibility for behaviour which has damaged this relationship (Johnson 2010, pp.46-48). Despite these positive steps, uneven or non-payment of compensation dating back to violence during the second civil war has hampered efforts at attaining a lasting reconciliation between communities across the border (Craze 2013, p.18, 48, fn.22).

Post-independence challenges, national conflict (2013-2018), and developments following the R-ARCSS (2018-present)

Relations between the Dinka Malual and neighbouring pastoralist groups from Sudan have been impacted by the disputed 14-Mile Area, which became a focal point for conflict with the SPLA and SAF (with some Rizeigat support) between 2010 and 2012 (Craze 2013, pp.58-56). The dispute has its roots in a contested internal provincial border – known as the ‘Munro-Wheatley line’, after the British colonial governors of Darfur and Bahr-el Ghazal provinces responsible for its establishment in 1924 – which mainly related to regulating access rights for dry season grazing (Johnson 2010, p.42). The line was set approximately 14 miles south of the Bahr el-Arab/Kiir River, though during and after the second civil war a number of SPLA positions were located north of this line.

During the run-up to South Sudanese independence, elements of communities either side of the border pushed to maximise their share of the territory, with governments in Juba and Khartoum backing their respective constituencies (Small Arms Survey 2013). In addition to being a dispute over land and borders, the 14-Mile Area has also become a focal point for unresolved community grievances dating back to the second civil war. In 2012, an agreement that included provisions to demilitarise the area – including the withdrawal of SPLA forces – contributing to further polarisation (Small Arms Survey 2013). The inflamed tensions around the border demarcation contributed to the recruitment of the Mathiang Anyoor, an armed group comprising mostly Dinka youth, who were later deployed in Juba in December 2013 (Boswell 2019, p.4, 6). Intermittent progress has since been made on the modalities of border demarcation and monitoring of the area (ICG 2018; Radio Dabanga 2019; Sudan Tribune 2019). Intermittent border tensions and closures have affected cross-border economic relations and livelihoods (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, p.67).

Aweil North was directly affected by violence and insecurity during the early stages of the national conflict (2013-2018). Following a series of desertions of SPLA forces from Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in April and May 2014, parts of Aweil North (including the Gok Machar) area were affected by a series of clashes between the SPLA and deserting forces in July 2014. These events, in conjunction with the defection of forces under the command of a General from Aweil North in May 2014, resulted in a number of measures being taken by authorities in Aweil North to bolster government control of the area (Small Arms Survey 2014a, pp.3-5). Clashes between the SPLA and defected forces were reported in the sensitive 14-Mile area in September 2014 (Small Arms Survey 2014b) and 2015 (Sudan Tribune 2015). As is discussed further in the profile for Aweil West and Raja counties, Aweil North was part of the (now defunct) Lol State between late 2015 and early 2020.

Following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, Aweil North has been largely stable, though has been affected by unrest linked to developments in the disputed Abyei area. In August 2021, UNISFA began a withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from Aweil East and Aweil North counties. UNISFA troops have been deployed in Gok Machar and within the contested 14-Mile Area, but some South Sudanese residents of the area demonstrated against the mission (Radio Tamazuj 2021c).

These incidents followed a series of disputes regarding the placement of a UNISFA camp to control arms smuggling in late 2020 or early 2021. Initially the camp was to be located at Raiq Mandalla north of Kiir Adem, though Sudanese RSF and some members of the Rizeigat community allegedly issued threats to UNISFA, leading them to withdraw from the area. UNISFA subsequently attempted to establish a different camp at Malek Mir (between Gok Machar and Kiir Adem), though this was rejected by the local Dinka community, who objected to UNISFA’s decision to withdraw from the north bank of the Bahr el-Arab/Kiir River. This came alongside accusations among residents of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal that UNISFA GPS points referred to areas within the 14-Mile Area as being within Sudan. Soon after UNISFA vacated the compound in Gok Machar in October 2021, the compound was reportedly looted by residents and elements of the security forces. Looted items were later confiscated by security forces who searched several areas of the county at the behest of the Aweil North County Commissioner.

Due to pressure from drought and the conflict that began in Sudan in April 2023, some Sudanese pastoralists have recently attempted to migrate with their cattle into Northern Bahr el-Ghazal without prior agreement from local communities, and before a customary pre-migration conference had taken place. This led to some communities from Aweil North and Aweil Centre counties to reject the arrival of Rizeigat pastoralists to their areas, raising the possibility of further tensions (Majok 2024, p.13; The Radio Community 2023). In addition, the market at Kiir Adem has reportedly shifted from civilian to military control, while alleged smuggling of vehicles and construction materials into Northern Bahr el-Ghazal – alongside the movement of fuel and other commodities from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal into Sudan – have also been reported (Majok 2024, p.6, 15-16). The state has reportedly experienced a recent increase in military recruitment, and also an increase in cross-border arms smuggling from Sudan into South Sudan (Majok 2024, p.18).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Malual North (County Headquarters at Gok Machar), Ariath (Ariath), Malual Centre (formerly Pamat, now Majak Kaar), Malual East (Maper Dut Thou), Malual West (Majak Baai)

UN OCHA 2020 map of Aweil North County: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-aweil-north-county-reference-map

Roads:

• A primary road connects Gok-Machar to the Sudanese border to the county’s north. Seasonal road conditions are unknown. The same road runs southeast and connects Gok Machar to the state capital Aweil Town via Nyamlell. This road was considered “passable with difficulties” during both the rainy and dry seasons of 2022 and 2023 (respectively) by the Logistics Cluster. The road is currently undergoing repairs, as of September 2023.
• A primary road runs south of Gok-Machar to Aweil West County, whereupon it becomes a secondary road running west to Raja town in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. This road was deemed “passable with difficulties” during both the rainy and dry seasons of 2022 and 2023 (respectively) by the Logistics Cluster, up until Gossinga in Raja County, where the road becomes impassable. Logistics Cluster maps indicate that a bypass road from Gossinga to Raja town is passable with difficulty.
• A network of secondary roads is located in the eastern areas of Aweil North, running to Sudan and east and north-east to Aweil East County. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: None

REFERENCES

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

African Rights. (1997). Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Amnesty International. (1989). Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, December 1989. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Boswell, A. (2019). Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Burr, J.M. and Collins, R.O. (1995). Requiem For the Sudan: War, Drought, And Disaster Relief on the Nile. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

Concordis International. (2012). Crossing The Line: Transhumance In Transition Along the Sudan- South Sudan Border October 2012. Retrieved 6 October 2023.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

Duffield, M., Jok, J.M., Keen, D., Loane, G., O’Reilly, F., Ryle, J., and Winter, P. (2000). Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance Field Evaluation Study. Trinity College Dublin. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Gorur, A., Jok, J.M., & Mayai, A.T. (2014). Perception of Security in Aweil North County, South Sudan. Sudd Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2018). Keeping the Hotline Open Between Sudan and South Sudan. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Johnson, D.H. (2010). When Boundaries Become Borders: The impact of boundary-making in Southern Sudan’s frontier zones. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Keen, D. (1994/2008). The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine & Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1983-2005). Oxford: James Currey.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J. (2019). Monetized Livelihoods and Militarized Labour in South Sudan’s Borderlands. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Leonardi, C. and Santschi, M. (2016). Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: boundary disputes and land governance. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Mahmud, U.A. and Baldo, S.A. (1987). The Dhein Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan, September 1987. Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Majak, D.D. (1991). ‘The Malual Dinka-Baqqara Border Conflict and the Impact on National Integration in the Sudan’, Northeast African Studies, 13 (1), pp. 73-83. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

Majok, J. (2024). War and the Borderland: Northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the Sudan conflict. Rift Valley Institute/XCEPT. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

Mawson, A. (1991). ‘Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka, 1985-89’, Disasters, 15 (2), pp.137-149. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Radio Dabanga. (2019). Agreement signed on contested Sudan-South Sudan border areas. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj (2021a). Aweil North County: Heavy rains disrupt border trade with Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021b). Post-migration conference concludes in Aweil East. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021c). UNISFA begins to withdraw troops from Aweil North, East Counties. Retrieved 3 October 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). The 14-Mile Area [September 2013 version]. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2014a). The Conflict in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States: Describing events through 10 October 2014. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2014b). The 14-Mile Area: Describes events through 25 October 2014. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2015). South Sudanese rebels occupy strategic areas in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2019). Sudan, South Sudan agree on border demarcation report. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Swisspeace. (2014). Final report: Northern Bahr-el Ghazal State, South Sudan Conflict Sensitivity Assessment. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

The Radio Community. (2023). NBGS rejects unscheduled return of Reizegat cattle. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Information from interactive dashboard retrieved 20 July 2023.

Wilson, J. (2014). Local Peace Processes in Sudan and South Sudan. USIP. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

World Vision International. (2019). Fire razes villages in South Sudan’s Aweil North; 37 people died and 93 injured. Retrieved 18 July 2023. 

REPORTS on AWEIL NORTH

Boswell, A. (2019). Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Gorur, A., Jok, J.M., & Mayai, A.T. (2014). Perception of Security in Aweil North County, South Sudan. Sudd Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

IOM. (2013). Village Assessment Survey: Aweil North County Atlas. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2020). COVID-19 in South Sudan’s Borderlands A view from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2020). Breaking Out of the Borderlands: Understanding migrant pathways from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2022). ‘Class, cash and control in the South Sudan and Darfur borderlands’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 7 (4-6), pp. 283-306. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Kindersley, N. (2018). Politics, power and chiefship in famine and war: A study of the former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Majok, J. D. (2021). War, Migration and Work – Agricultural labour and cross-border migration from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Rift Valley Institute. (2020). South Sudan: Hussein Abdel Bagi deepens his control of the borderland. RVI Field Update 5. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Saferworld. (2020). Community Security Assessment Gok- Machar, Aweil North (May 2020). Retrieved 4 March 2024.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.