Panyikang County, Upper Nile State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 45,427
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 29,778
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 67,054

Ethnic groups: Shilluk/Chollo and Padang Dinka

Displacement Figures Q2 2022:  31,076 IDPs (+25,562 Q1 2020) and 7,827 returnees (- 4,787 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – no data; IPC Projections: December to March 2023 – no data; April to July 2023 – no data

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Panyikang County is located in Upper Nile State. It borders Malakal County to the north-east and Baliet County to the east. It also borders Unity State (Pariang County) to the west, Jonglei State (Fangak and Canal/Pigi counties) to the south and Sudan to the north.

The county is categorized as part of the Northern sorghum and cattle livelihood zone (FEWSNET 2018). An estimated 35% of households were engaged in farming in 2019, with other common livelihoods including rearing livestock, fishing, and foraging (FAO/WFP 2019). This number of households engaged in farming has been maintained as of 2021. Gross cereal yields were reported at 0.8 tonnes per hectare in 2021 and 0.7 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022, FAO/WFP 2023). The main crops are sorghum and maize, as well as pumpkin, cowpeas, sesame (simsim), okra and other garden vegetables. Some households keep cattle, goats and sheep.

The White Nile slices the county in a V-shape while continuing onto Malakal town. The Sobat River flows along the county’s eastern border before draining into the White Nile. Fishing from the many rivers in the county is seasonal, taking place primarily in the swamps towards the end of the rainy season and into the dry season. Prior to the national conflict, the principal livelihoods hazards were crop pests, livestock disease and flooding.

In 2013, FEWSNET reported low food insecurity in the region given the diversified sources of livelihoods.  However, the violence in the region since December 2013 has induced large-scale displacement, disrupted normal farming cycles, and severely imperilled livelihoods. In 2015, an IRNA reported that systematic looting of animals by fighters in the areas left the Panyikang population with few livestock. Whilst FEWSNET reported modest recoveries in livestock ownership by 2019, ownership remains low compared to historical levels (FEWSNET 2019). Dependence on fishing and farming has therefore increased, although the conflict has disrupted access and cultivation, thereby reducing yields for both. This has led many residents to turn to other income-generating activities such as the production of Gum Arabic, charcoal and firewood.

The most recent IPC projections (as of November 2022) lack sufficient data to ascertain current conditions or forecast food insecurity for the county in the near future. This is likely to be a result of insecurity in the county in the wake of clashes between the SPLA-IO Kitgweng and Agwelek factions (and allied militia) in the second half of 2022, which is discussed in further detail in the Conflict Dynamics section. However, IPC data from March 2022 put Panyikang County at Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity, and it was predicted to remain at the same level for the following quarter.

In 2021, Panyikang was identified as a flood affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and as a county with over 25,000 flood affected people by OCHA.  In April 2021, floods displaced over 7,000 people from Fangak into Tonga. In mid-August and early September 2021, the Nile burst its banks gushing waters into the entire western bank and displaced people in Tonga town, Nyiluak, Pakwa and Uwachi.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

The HQ for Panyikang County is located in Panyikang town in Tonga Payam. Access to potable water in the county is limited, which makes the local population vulnerable to waterborne diseases. As the security situation stabilized following the signing of the peace agreement in 2018, increases in access to healthcare facilities and services were also observed.

Panyikang is home to three (3), eighteen (18) primary schools and Dr Kunjwok Secondary in Tonga Payam. There are no Early Childhood Development centres (though were reported in 2021), and no secondary schools.

Panyikang County was reported to have fifteen (15) health facilities including seven (7) functional health facilities, among them five (5) PHCUs and two (2) PHCCs in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 0.90 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.49 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. No hospitals were reported in Panyikang County.

Panyikang County was the only county in South Sudan facing a ‘Catastrophic’ severity of humanitarian need according to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, which is the highest possible level of humanitarian need classification. The same report estimated that there are 56,325 people in Panyikang County with humanitarian needs (compared to 49,000 in 2021), which represents approximately 84% of the estimated population of the county reported in the HNO. The severity of the situation in Panyikang is the result of fighting between the SPLA-IO Kitgweng and Agwelek factions that began in late July 2022. As is discussed in further detail below, much of the fighting was initially concentrated in and around Panyikang (and particularly the port of Tonga), displacing 28,000 people (WHO 2022). A further 4,000 people were re-displaced from Adidang IDP camp in Panyikang to Malakal town following an assault on the camp in September 2022 (UNHCR 2022).

In 2020 Panyikang was one of three counties (along with Maiwut and Mundri East) that were reported in the HNO to have the most restrictive access constraints in 2019 due to active hostilities, violence against humanitarian personnel and assets and the physical environment. This situation was repeated in 2021 with the HNO identifying Panyikang as one of the five counties (along with Longochuk, Maiwut, Mundri East and Rumbek North) which experienced the highest access constraints in 2020, including through taxation. Insecurity and travel restrictions have again affected transportation along the River Nile and led to many gaps in understanding of humanitarian needs following the outbreak of hostilities in mid-2022 (discussed further below). Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 485 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan were registered in Tonga (UNHCR/IOM 2023).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Panyikang County lies along the riverine corridor that links Juba and Bor to Malakal, and sits at the intersection between the three largest ethnic groups of Upper Nile State, and at the edge of the historical Shilluk/Chollo Kingdom. Due in part to its location and historical association with various SPLM/A splinter factions, Panyikang County has been vulnerable to both militarisation and increasingly ethnicised conflicts that have affected various parts of Upper Nile, heightening tensions between parts of the Shilluk, Nuer, and Dinka communities in the process. Panyikang is also the home of a number of prominent political and military elites, including Johnson Olonyi, a veteran commander linked to several groups active in the area.

Panyikang during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)

During the early stages of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), Panyikang was embroiled in the conflict between the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya 2 forces, with the areas of Taufikia and Doleib Hill along the county’s southern border with Jonglei State subject to attacks (Africa Watch 1990, p.79). Amnesty International (1989, p.24) reported allegations of attacks on civilians by the warring parties in the border area between south-western Upper Nile and north-western Jonglei states. This violence would feed into tensions between parts of the Nuer and Shilluk communities, which would be exacerbated by events in the 1990s and 2000s, as is discussed further in the profile for Malakal County. Panyikang would be drawn more closely into complex politics of the conflict in the wake of the 1991 SPLM/A split, with the SPLM/A-Nasir faction consolidating control of the area, albeit with divisions reported among parts of the Shilluk community with regards to their support for the Nasir faction (Craze 2013, fn.200). The Nasir faction would gradually disintegrate over the subsequent years, morphing into the SPLM/A-United faction in 1993, before unravelling over the subsequent two years (Johnson 2003, pp.118-119).

Unlike other areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei states that had been affected by recurrent violent factionalism during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of (predominantly Shilluk) areas west of the White Nile tended to be intermittently or unevenly affected by factional conflicts or associated raiding. This was in part because of an agreement reached between Lam Akol and the governor of Upper Nile in 1993 to uphold security and facilitate aid delivery (Johnson 2003, p.204). By 1994, Lam Akol assumed the leadership of a part of the SPLM/A-United faction, with this sub-faction being reformed as a predominantly Shilluk force based in Tonga, whose leadership was aligned with the government (Johnson 2003, p.126; Rolandesn 2005, pp.37, 126).

The continued process of fragmentation of the broader SPLM/A-United faction would result in the increasing polarisation of the Shilluk and Nuer communities, amid escalating violence on the western border of Jonglei and Upper Nile states (Nyaba 1997, p.132). In 1995, agreements were reached between the SPLM/A-United sub-faction under the command of Lam Akol and Padang Dinka commanders from different SPLM/A factions who controlled areas to the south and west of the county (Akol 2003, pp.256-57, 404-7; Bradbury et al. 2006, p.151). However, instability and fighting persisted in parts of southern Panyikang and adjoining parts of present-day Malakal County on the west bank of the Nile (Akol 2003, pp.260-68).

Aside from periodic cattle raiding and intermittent fighting in the Tonga area, Panyikang was largely stable following the April 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement and follow-up Fashoda Agreement. The Khartoum Peace Agreement organised various militias and SPLM/A splinter groups into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), with Lam Akol’s SPLM/A-United sub-faction joining the SSDF after signing the Fashoda Agreement the following September. Additionally, a local peace agreement was reached between the Shilluk and the Dinka community from neighbouring Pariang County in December 2000 (Murphy 2001, p.155).

The relative security of areas along the west bank of the Nile would not endure after Lam Akol rejoined the SPLM/A in 2003. Following his defection, several mid-level Shilluk SPLM/A-United commanders remained with the government and SSDF, while southern parts of Panyikang were occupied by SSDF militia led by ethnic Nuer commanders (Young 2006). The defection of Lam Akol – and the concentration of various SSDF militia – set the stage for violence that escalated between government-aligned militia and parts of the Shilluk community in 2004, which further exacerbated divisions between parts of the Nuer and Shilluk communities (Africa Confidential 2005; IRIN 2004; Rogier 2005, fn.166). Moreover, the defection was also linked to divisions within the Shilluk community (ISS 2004, p.18).

Panyikang during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and early independence eras (2005-2013)

Following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the mid-level SPLM/A-United commanders who did not join the SPLM/A with Lam Akol in 2003 would subsequently merge with the SPLA after the 2006 Juba Declaration between the Southern Sudanese government and the SSDF (Young 2006, pp.43, 46). Although Panyikang County became more peaceable during the early CPA years, the county was increasingly affected by boundary disputes and rising political tensions between parts of the Shilluk and Padang Dinka communities. The increasing polarisation unfolding in western areas of Upper Nile State – which is discussed further in the profile for Malakal County – fed into instances of conflict in Panyikang, including in Nagidar along the contested border with Baliet County (Small Arms Survey 2016, pp.6-7; Sudan Tribune 2009). A border dispute between Panyikang and Canal/Pigi also reportedly led to fighting in 2010 (UNMIS 2010, p.4).

Panyikang was particularly affected by violence surrounding the 2010 elections, during which SPLA forces were deployed to predominantly Shilluk areas of Fashoda and Panyikang to conduct a disarmament campaign. The campaign occurred amid national-level tensions surrounding the establishment a new political party led by Lam Akol (Small Arms Survey 2011a). Human Rights Watch observed that a number of human rights abuses allegedly occurred during the campaign (HRW 2011), while the Small Arms Survey has reported that the SPLA forces were predominantly from the Nuer community, further straining relations between parts of the Shilluk and Nuer (Craze 2019, p.31).

The county was also affected by post-election violence linked to disputed election results from April 2010, with a number of opposition factions (loosely organised into a single opposition movement) emerging in parts of Upper Nile (Small Arms Survey 2011b). Several months after the election, a Shilluk chief was killed in Panyikang in unclear circumstances (Sudan Tribune 2010). Following an August 2010 amnesty agreement, a number of opposition factions assembled for integration into the military. However, fighting broke out between the SPLA and the predominantly Shilluk ‘Agwelek’ forces commanded by Johnson Olonyi – who were awaiting integration in southern Panyikang. The fighting spread to a number of other areas in Upper Nile and along the border with Sudan’s Southern Kordofan State, before Olonyi accepted a further amnesty deal in June 2013 (Small Arms Survey 2013, pp.6, 7).

National conflict (2013-2018) and post-R-ARCSS violence (2018-present)

Panyikang was heavily exposed to fighting at several points during the national conflict (2013-2018). At the outset of the conflict, Johnson Olonyi remained allied to the government, while his Agwelek forces initially prevented SPLA-IO forces from transiting through areas under his command. The presence and alleged behaviour of SPLA-IO forces in the area revived historical tensions between parts of the Nuer and Shilluk communities, with some SPLA-IO commanders linked to previous violence between elements of the two communities being implicated in the conflict (Craze 2019, pp.36, 38). Intermittent fighting persisted across 2014, with the county being contested by government and opposition forces (Small Arms Survey 2015). Fighting in August 2014 was associated with attacks on civilians and their dwellings, alongside the looting of livestock (IRNA 2015).

Following the outbreak of fighting between the SPLA and Agwelek forces in and around Malakal in May 2015 (discussed further in the profile for Malakal County), violence increased in parts of Panyikang as the Agwelek faction re-aligned to the SPLA-IO. This included a number of attacks on Shilluk settlements, resulted in significant displacement (Craze 2019, pp.54, 63). Fighting resumed in early 2017, with an SPLA offensive resulting in the capture of Agwelek bases in Panyikang and Fashoda counties, and driving further displacement (Craze 2019, pp.76-79).

Following the signing of the 2018 R-ARCSS, there were no reports of further fighting between SSPDF and SPLA-IO Agwelek forces in Panyikang. However, the county remained militarised, and was divided between SSPDF controlled areas to the north and east, and areas held by the SPLA-IO Agwelek faction to the south and west. In 2020 and 2021, humanitarian actors reported increasingly high taxation and difficulties at checkpoints along the riverine corridor. In August 2021, a number of SPLA-IO commanders – including Johnson Olonyi – broke from the leadership of the SPLA-IO through the announcement of the Kitgweng Declaration. Within Panyikang, although SPLA-IO Agwelek forces joined the new SPLA-IO Kitgweng faction, some SPLA-IO forces in the area (including some Nuer elements) remainder loyal to the SPLA-IO leadership under Riek Machar. The county commissioner of Panyikang proved an important interlocutor between the leadership of the two factions, and largely managed to contain conflict in the county.

Despite maintaining stability in the face of the initial SPLA-IO split, Panyikang was heavily affected by the large-scale violence that resulted from the split within the SPLA-IO Kitgweng faction that emerged over the summer of 2022. This fighting had a number of localised, subnational, and national dynamics with devastating impact on the civilian population and humanitarian access (Small Arms Survey 2023; UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023). Initial fighting pitted Agwelek forces against Kitgweng forces in Panyikang’s Tonga Payam (Craze 2022, p.46). Soon this intra-factional fighting was transposed onto a broader canvas, with the Agwelek forces involved in a series of clashes against a broader oppositional Nuer force comprising the SPLA-IO, white army militias from Fangak and Ayod counties,** and the Kitgweng faction.

By mid-August the violence spilled over into parts of Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties, with fighting focused on the control of strategic ports, and in particular Tonga, which is an important centre for collecting tax revenues and for the movement of military personnel and equipment (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, fn.36). The conflict also restricted humanitarian access to the area, while a number of health centres in Panyikang were reportedly looted or destroyed (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, p.20). As reported by the UNMISS/UN OHCHR (2023, p.9), September 2022 saw offensives increasingly targeting civilians, including an alleged attack on Shilluk IDPs at Adidiang in Panyikang County that resulted in significant re-displacement to Malakal, raising tensions between Shilluk and Nuer IDPs in the PoC site. Intermittent offensives during September left the critical port town of Tonga in Panyikang in control of joint SPLA-IO loyalist and Kitgweng forces, with renewed violence affected other settlements in Panyikang by the end of the month. Sporadic clashes continued in Panyikang for the remainder of 2022, though the focal of the violence shifted northwards during this time, and is discussed further in the profile for Fashoda County. Although there were no reports of major violence in the area for much of 2023, clashes between two SPLA-IO factions escalated in October 2023 (Radio Tamazuj 2023).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Tonga (County HQ), Anakdiar, Dheteim, Pakang, Panyidwoi, Panyikang

UN OCHA 2020 map of Panyikang County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-panyikang-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A secondary road between Malakal to the east and Pariang County to the west runs through Panyikang County. Seasonal road conditions are unknown. At Tonga town, a spur of the road veers north-west into Sudan, before returning to Pariang County. Conditions for this road are also unknown.
• In the east of the county, primary and secondary roads connect to roads in northern Jonglei state, and also to the primary road running east from Malakal to Nasir. Seasonal road conditions are unknown, and the Malakal-Nasir road was deemed impassable in both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• River access between Malakal and Tonga is also an important means of transport of people and goods. Due to escalating conflict from mid-to-late 2022, insecurity as well as access problems have been reported in the area.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing-Sites and Airstrips: None
Other Heli-landing sites and airstrips listed by local actors: Tonga

REFERENCES

Africa Confidential. (2005). Gunmen or soldiers? Retrieved 5 February 2024.

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Akol, L. (2003). SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration. Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse.

Amnesty International. (1989). Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, December 1989. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Bradbury, M., Ryle, J., Medley, M. and Sansculotte-Greenidge, K. (2006). Local Peace Processes in Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2019). Risk of farming (IPC phase 5) will persist in 2020 despite slight improvements during harvesting period. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2011). South Sudan: Improve Accountability for Security Force Abuses. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

IRIN [The New Humanitarian]. (2004). Fighting escalating in Shilluk Kingdom. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

IRNA. (2015). IRNA Report: Nyilwak, Panyikang Payam, Upper Nile State, 18 August 2015. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

ISS, Institute for Security Studies. (2004). The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF): A challenge to the Sudan Peace Process. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Murphy, P. (2001). “Even the Meeting Trees are Perishing”: Planning For Peace in Sudan. IGAD. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 25 February 2024; note that pages referred to use the page numbering system on the version uploaded to the Sudan Open Archive, and may not reflect the original page order.

Nyaba, P.A. (1997). The Politics of Liberation: An Insider’s View. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2018). River, land routes opened between Malakal and Tonga: official. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). Government to probe Tonga village attack. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

Rogier, E. (2005). No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace. Clingendael Institute. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

Rolandsen, Ø. (2005). Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s. Mordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Small Arms Survey. (2011a). SPLM/A–Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2011b). Fighting for spoils: Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2015). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 April 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2009). Eight people killed during fresh tribal clashes in Upper Nile. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2010). Upper Nile probes killing of Shilluk chief. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

UNHCR. (2022). Thousands displaced by escalating conflict in South Sudan’s Greater Upper Nile Region. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Information from interactive dashboard retrieved 20 July 2023.

UNMIS, UN Mission in Sudan. (2010). Resident Coordinator Support Office, Upper Nile State Briefing Pack. Retrieved 3 February 2024.

UNMISS/UN OHCHR. (2023). Attacks against civilians in Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan: August to December 2022. Retrieved 5 January 2024.

WFP. (2018). South Sudan—Rapid Appraisal Tonga, Panyikang County, October 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

WHO. (2022). WHO South Sudan: Monthly Humanitarian Situation Report (Issue 11, November 2022). Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Young, J. (2006). The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

REPORTS on PANYIKANG

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2022). The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile since the Signing of the R-ARCSS. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2024). Playing Angry Birds with an Exiled Rebel. The Dial. Retrieved 8 February 2024.

Danish Refugee Council. (2018). Panyikang and Tonga Protection Assessment. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Short, A. (2015). Cattle and Pastoralism in Greater Upper Nile Research Report.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: ‘White’ armies are distinguished from ‘black’ armies in that the white armies are informal, and the black armies are the organized, uniformed forces.